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ABSTRACT: 18 studies using data from 20 highly developed, developing, and less 
developed countries document that average wages in exporting firms are higher 
than in non-exporting firms from the same industry and region. The existence of 
these so-called exporter wage premia is one of the stylized facts found in the 
emerging literature on the microeconometrics of international trade. This paper 
uses a large and rich set of linked employer-employee data from Germany to 
demonstrate that these premia vanish when individual characteristics of the 
employees and of the work place are controlled for. 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: 18 Studien, die sich auf Daten aus 20 hochentwickelten, sich 
entwickelnden und weniger entwickelten Ländern stützen, zeigen, dass die 
Durchschnittslöhne in exportierenden Firmen höher liegen als in nicht-
exportierenden Firmen aus der gleichen Branche und Region. Die Existenz dieser 
Lohnzuschläge bei Exporteuren ist einer der stilisierten Fakten der wachsenden 
Literatur zur Mikroökonometrie des internationalen Handels. Die vorliegende 
Arbeit verwendet einen großen und reichhaltigen Satz von kombinierten Firmen-
Beschäftigten-Daten aus Deutschland um zu zeigen, dass diese Lohnzuschläge 
verschwinden, wenn die individuellen Charakteristika der Mitarbeiter und des 
Arbeitsplatzes angemessen berücksichtigt werden. 
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1. MOTIVATION 
Some ten years ago Bernard and Jensen (1995) published a Brookings paper on 
“Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing” that used hundreds of 
thousands of plant level data to provide facts and figures on exporting plants 
compared to their non-exporting counter-parts. One of the new and exciting 
findings documented in this paper is that exporters tend to pay higher wages and 
benefits: Average wages and benefits (per worker, per production worker, and per 
non-production worker) are higher in exporting plants than in non-exporting plants 
of all size classes. Exporter wage premia are statistically significant for all 
categories of wages and benefits after controlling for capital per worker, size of 
plant, multi-plant dummy, industry, year, plant age, and region. Coefficients of 
exporter status dummies are statistically significant in fixed effects regressions 
controlling for capital per worker, hours per worker, size of plant, and year. 
 
The Bernard and Jensen (1995) paper started a literature. Table 1 provides a 
synopsis
1 of 18 studies covering 20 different countries from highly developed 
economies like the U.S., Germany, and Sweden, and emerging economies like 
Taiwan, Korea, and Mexico, to a transition country (Estonia) and least developed 
Sub-Saharan African economies like Burundi or Ethiopia. The empirical strategies 
used in these papers replicate (sometimes only partly) the approach introduced by 
Bernard and Jensen, and the results regarding the exporter wage premia are 
broadly consistent with the findings from the pioneering study. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
An open question not dealt with in this literature is whether these exporter wage 
premia do indeed indicate that exporting plants pay higher wages in the sense that 
comparable workers are better paid when working on a comparable work place for 
an exporter, i.e. ceteris paribus.
2 Given that all the empirical studies listed in Table 
1 use average data at the plant or firm level, individual characteristics of the 
                                            
1  We intend to keep this synopsis comprehensive and up-to-date. Readers who are aware of 
other studies not covered or of more recent (published) versions of studies listed are kindly 
asked to send an e-mail to <wagner@uni-lueneburg.de>. 
2  Another question that is taken into account in this literature is the direction of causality: Do 
exporters pay higher wages because they are exporters? Did they pay higher wages before 
they started to export? Do wages increase faster in firms that (started to) export than in 
comparable non-exporting firms? In this paper we focus on the question whether the premia do 
exist at all or not. For a discussion of the pitfalls of the standard approach used to investigate 
the direction of causality, and a solution based on a matching approach, see Wagner (2002).  4 
workers that might influence their productivity (and, therefore, their wages) cannot 
be taken into account, and certain characteristics of the work place that might call 
for compensating wage differentials are not represented adequately. This 
shortcoming has been recognized from the outset: Commenting on the 
presentation of the paper by Bernard and Jensen, Robert Z. Lawrence argued that 
"the impact of exports, while positive and statistically significant, is considerably 
reduced once the effects of capital intensity, industry, plant scale, and location are 
controlled for. One suspects, moreover, that the premiums would be even further 
reduced if the authors were able to control for worker characteristics. Thus the 
wage benefits that are attributable solely to exporting appear to be rather small." 
(Bernard and Jensen 1995, p. 113f.) 
 
Besides providing a synopsis of the literature on exporter wage premia in Table 1 
this paper contributes to the literature by testing for the existence of these premia 
when individual characteristics of the employees and the work place are controlled 
for in an appropriate way. To do so we use a rich German linked employer-
employee data set, a type of data that has not been used to investigate this topic 
before. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data 
set while section 3 explains our line of econometric investigation. Section 4 
provides results for exporter wage premia based on plant level data and on linked 
employer-employee data using information for both individual workers and the 
plants they are working in. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE LINKED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DATA SET 
The use of matched employer-employee data has recently become popular as it 
allows a more detailed analysis of economic relationships. In particular, various 
analyses of the labor market can benefit from the availability of employer-
employee data.
3 In this paper, we use the LIAB, which combines the employment 
statistics of the German Federal Labor Services with plant level data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. 
 
The employment statistics (cf. Bender, Haas and Klose 2000) cover all employees 
and trainees subject to social security. They exclude, among others, the self-
employed, family workers, a subgroup of civil servants (“Beamte”), students 
enrolled in higher education and those in marginal employment. The employment 
                                            
3  A survey of analyses using matched employer-employee data sets can be found in Abowd and 
Kramarz (1999).  5 
statistics cover nearly 80% of all employed persons in western Germany and 
about 85% in eastern Germany. They are collected by the social insurance 
institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced in 1973 and are 
made available to the Federal Employment Services. Notifications are prescribed 
at the beginning and at the end of a person's employment in a plant. In addition an 
annual report for each employee is compulsory at the end of a year. Misreporting 
is legally sanctioned. The employment statistics contain information on an 
employee's occupation, the occupational status, and gross earnings up to the 
contribution assessment ceiling, and on individual characteristics like sex, age, 
nationality, marital status, and qualification. Each personnel record also contains 
the establishment identifier, the industry, and the size of the plant. 
 
Starting in 1993, the IAB Establishment Panel (cf. Kölling 2000) is drawn from a 
stratified sample of the plants included in the employment statistics, where the 
strata are defined over industries and plant sizes (large plants are oversampled), 
but the sampling within each cell is random. In 1993, the sample started with 4,265 
plants, covering 0.27% of all plants in western Germany (2 million) and 11% of 
total employment (29 million). In 1996, the eastern German establishment panel 
started with 4,313 establishments representing 1.10% of all plants (391 thousand) 
and 11% of total employment (6 million). Altogether, the number of establishments 
interviewed increased until the year 2003 up to nearly 16,000, in order to allow 
regional analysis at the federal state level. The IAB Establishment Panel has been 
set up for the needs of the Federal Labor Services to provide further information 
about the demand side of the labor market. Therefore, detailed information on the 
composition of the workforce and its development through time constitutes a major 
part of the questionnaire. Further questions include information on training and 
further education, wages, working time, business activities, establishment policies, 
and general information about the plant. Other topics, for instance, questions on 
innovations or the flexibility of labor, are asked biannually or triannually. 
 
The LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics and the IAB 
Establishment Panel through a plant identifier which is available in both data sets.
4 
This matched employer-employee data set, which is unique for Germany, currently 
comprises the years 1993 to 1997. Since precise information on the collective 
bargaining regime of plants is not available before 1995, we can only make use of 
                                            
4  The LIAB data are confidential but not exclusive. Starting in 2005, they will be available for non-
commercial research by visiting the data access center of the German Federal Labor Services 
at the IAB in Nuremberg, Germany. Researchers interested in replications or extensions of our 
work may contact the first author (e-mail: Thorsten.Schank@wiso.uni-erlangen.de) for a copy of 
the Stata do-files used to produce the results reported here.  6 
the waves 1995 to 1997. We exclude establishments that are located in the 
eastern part of Germany since the economic situation (and the level of wages) in 
post-communist eastern Germany still differs considerably from that in western 
Germany. Also, we focus on the manufacturing sector since exports are only of 
minor importance in the service sector. Therefore, in the regressions we end up 
with a sample of 1,860,710 observations of 903,614 employees in 2,948 
establishments. 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
The basic specification for our econometric investigations relates the wage (wit) of 
individual i at time t to characteristics of the individual (Xit) and the establishment 
(Zj(it)). 
 
it ij t it j it j it it J Z Z X w ε δ γ γ β + + + + = ) ( 2 ) ( , 2 1 ) ( , 1 ln            ( 1 )  
 
Xit is a vector of individual characteristics which are typically included in the 
empirical literature on wages. These comprises the following variables, all of which 
are available from the employment statistics: the age of the employee, the squared 
age of the employee, a gender dummy, dummies for the occupational status of the 
employee (unskilled blue-collar, skilled blue-collar, master craftsman/foreman, 
white-collar worker), dummies indicating that the employee is working part-time, is 
married, is of non-German nationality, as well as 98 occupational dummies. 
 
Zj(it) defines characteristics of the plant, where the subscript j(it) indicates that at 
time t all workers in a plant j share the same value of Z. This vector of plant level 
variables can be split up into two subsets Z1 and Z 2. The former includes those 
characteristics which can be obtained either directly from the IAB Establishment 
Panel or by aggregating individual level information from the employment 
statistics, whereas the latter comprises variables only available from the IAB 
panel. In particular, Z1 includes the logarithm and the squared logarithm of the 
number of employees in the establishment and the proportions of female workers, 
of foreign workers, of workers with a graduate degree and of part-time employees. 
More precisely, we use the notation  1 Z  to take account of the fact that this subset 
captures plant averages of employee characteristics as compared to Z2, which 
reflects characteristics of the plant. These include information on exports 
(explained below), two dummies for the economic performance of the 
establishment, dummies indicating that overtime work exists, that shift work exists,  7 
that the plant applies a collective bargaining agreement (separately for sectoral 
and plant level agreements), an index for the state of technology in the plant, a 
dummy indicating that the plant has been founded within the last five years as well 
as nine federal state dummies and 13 industry dummies. Equation (1) also 
includes a vector of year dummies Jt(j,i), where the subscript t(i,j) indicates that the 
time effect in t is constant for all workers i and all plants j.  it ε denotes the error 
component. 
 
Aggregating Equation (1) at the plant level (i.e. aggregating over all employees i at 
time t in a plant j) yields the following relationship: 
 
jt j t jt jt jt jt J Z Z X w ε δ γ γ β + + + + = ) ( 2 , 2 1 , 1 ln             ( 2 )  
 
where  jt jt it it jt N w w ∑ ∈ =
) ( / ,  jt jt it it jt N X X ∑ ∈ =
) ( /  and  jt ε  analogously ( jt N  denotes 
the number of employees in plant j at time t). 
 
Our preferred specification to estimate the exporter wage premia is clearly given 
by Equation (1), since it controls for individual as well as plant level heterogeneity. 
However, we also want to investigate whether the obtained estimate changes 
when the specification is more restrictive. Therefore, we start off by assuming we 
had only a plant level data set at hand, i.e. we mimic the framework of those 
studies listed in Table 1 and estimate the following relationship which we denote 
as Model 1: 
 
jt j t jt jt jt J Z Z w ε δ γ γ + + + = ) ( 2 , 2 1 , 1 ln               ( 3 )  
 
We should point out again, that at this first stage all variables are based on 
information from the IAB panel (although information on  jt w  and 
jt Z , 1  would be 
available from the employment statistics as well). In the second step, we also 
include individual level information which has been aggregated to the plant level 
( jt X ). This is equivalent to estimating Equation (2). Henceforth, we refer to this 
specification as Model  2, which combines information from the employment 
statistics (the  ) jt X  with information from the IAB panel ( jt w , 
jt Z , 1  and 
jt Z , 2 ). As 
stated above, 
jt Z , 1  can also be extracted from the individual level data, and our 
Model  3 is based on this information from the employment statistics. Next, we 
replace our aggregate wage variable from the IAB panel with the plant level 
average of the individual wages reported in the employment statistic (Model 4). 
Hence, when estimating Model 4, only 
jt Z , 2  stems from the IAB panel, whereas 
jt jt jt Z X w , 2   and     as    well as   are extracted from the employment statistics. Finally, we  8 
estimate Model 5, which is the individual level wage equation given in Equation 
(1). The different specifications are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Different empirical specifications of wage equations 
Model Level  of 
aggregation 
Variables from IAB 
Establishment Panel 
Variables from employment 
statistics 
1 Plant  jt w , 
jt Z , 1 , 
jt Z , 2   
2 Plant  jt w , 
jt Z , 1 , 
jt Z , 2   jt X  
3 Plant  jt w , 
jt Z , 2   jt X , 
jt Z , 1  
4 Plant 
jt Z , 2   jt w ,  jt X , 
jt Z , 1  
5 Individual 
) ( , 2 it j Z   it w ,  it X , 
) ( , 1 it j Z  
Note:  All models include year dummies (J). 
 
The dependent variable in our investigation is the log of wages, taken from the IAB 
Establishment Panel in Models 1 to 3 and from the employment statistics in 
Models 4 and 5. Whereas the IAB panel data just provide information on the total 
wage bill of an establishment, the information on individual earnings in the 
employment statistics is more detailed, but it refers only to the income subject to 
social security contributions (i.e. up to the contribution assessment ceiling of the 
social security system). To take account for this censoring, we apply a Tobit 
analysis when estimating Model 5. At the plant level (Models 1-4), we use OLS 
since the distribution of the average wages analyzed is not censored.
5 
 
In accordance with the extant literature, we will also investigate whether our 
findings differ between blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. Therefore, we 
re-estimate Models 4 and 5 separately for both types of employees. For Models 1 
to 3, we cannot distinguish between both groups of employees, since the IAB 
panel only contains information on the total wage bill within a plant. 
 
The main focus of our analysis is on the influence of exports on wages. We can 
make use of two alternative indicators of exports: First, a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not a plant has any exports, and second the proportion of 
                                            
5  A special case is Model 4 which uses information from the employment statistics, where the 
individual wages have been aggregated to the plant level. Only one plant in the regression 
sample employs solely workers with censored wages (and hence, only for this plant the average 
wage is censored). In other plants, some of the workers earn wages that are censored, so that 
the average reported wage is smaller than the average of the actual wages. However, we have 
ignored any (small) bias arising from this underreporting since the bias should be correlated 
with individual qualification for which we control in our estimations and since there is no clear-
cut truncation point which could be taken into account in the plant-level estimations.  9 
exports within total sales. In our observation period 1995 to 1997, 69% of all plants 
in western German manufacturing were exporters (employing 92% of the workers 
in our sample) and the average export share of all plants was 23% (40% when 
employment-weighted as in the Appendix). More information on these and on the 
other variables employed in our analysis can be found in an Appendix Table. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results of our empirical investigations using pooled data for the period 1995 to 
1997 are presented in Tables 3a (for specifications with the export dummy) and 3b 
(for the export share).
6 In both cases we started with Model 1 and made only use 
of the information available from the IAB Establishment Panel, in such a way 
mimicking the traditional approach adopted by the studies listed in Table 1. As can 
be seen from the tables, these regressions are well determined, most of the 
coefficients estimated are highly significant and of the expected sign. While the 
impact of control variables needs not to be discussed in detail, it is interesting to 
see that the well-established firm size effect on wages shows up and that the 
composition of the work force plays an important role for the size of the wage bill. 
 
[Tables 3a and 3b near here] 
 
The principal result is that the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable 
indicating that a plant is an exporter is not significantly different from zero at any 
conventional error level, while the coefficient of exports measured as a proportion 
of total sales is positive and statistically significant. According to the results 
reported for Model  1 in Table 3b, an increase in the share of exports by ten 
percentage points raises the wage by some 0.7 percent. This result is in line with 
the findings reported by Bernard and Wagner (1997) in an earlier study using plant 
level data from official statistics for one of the western German federal states. 
 
Subsequently, we included additional information from the employment statistics 
(Model 2) and we replaced those independent variables from the IAB panel for 
which (more precise) data from the employment statistics were available 
                                            
6  We also ran cross-section estimations for each year (available from the authors upon request), 
the results of which are in accordance with those of the pooled estimations presented here. In 
all models, estimation of standard errors is not based on the assumption that observations 
within plants (and between years) are independent, i.e. we made use of the cluster (plant) 
option of Stata. All computations were done inside the German Federal Labor Services using 
Stata SE 8.2.  10 
(Model  3). In Model  4 even the dependent variable was replaced by the 
aggregated wage variable from the employment statistics. The results reported in 
Table 3a show that, like in Model 1, exporting per se does not have an impact on 
wages in Models 2 to 4. Looking at Table 3b we find that the positive effect of a 
higher share of exports in total sales reported for Model  1 vanishes when 
additional information on the quality of the workforce is added and when some firm 
characteristics are measured more precisely. Note that both the point estimates of 
the exports variable and the t-values decrease considerably from Model 1 to 
Model 4. This finding of no positive impact of a higher export share on wages 
contradicts the earlier findings for German plants mentioned above, and the 
results for many other countries summarized in Table 1. 
 
In the next step of our empirical exercise we looked at blue-collar and white-collar 
workers separately. The reason for this is that Bernard and Wagner (1997) report 
in their study using plant level data that the positive exporter wage differential is 
almost exclusively driven by higher wages of white-collar workers. As has been 
explained in section 3 above, Models 1 to 3 cannot be estimated separately for 
blue-collar and white-collar workers because the IAB Establishment Panel does 
not report average wages for these groups of employees. For Model 4, the results 
shown in Tables 4a and 4b point into the same direction as the earlier findings for 
Germany: While for white-collar workers both the estimated coefficient for the 
exporter dummy and for the share of exports in total sales is positive and 
statistically significant at a conventional level, this is not the case for blue-collar 
workers where exporting even seems to have a negative impact. 
 
[Tables 4a and 4b near here] 
 
Our preferred specification making optimal use of all information available at the 
most disaggregated level possible is Model 5. The results from estimations with 
both variants of the exports variable for all workers, and for blue-collar and white-
collar workers separately, can be summarized in one sentence: Contrary to what 
has been argued based on findings from earlier studies using data at the plant 
level, there is no such thing as an exporter wage differential. None of the 
estimated coefficients reported  in Tables 3a to 4b  for the export variable in 
Model 5 is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level or better. 
  11 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The bottom line of the empirical exercise performed in this study is that in 
(western) Germany exporting firms do not pay higher wages, ceteris paribus. The 
exporter wage premia vanish if linked employer-employee data instead of plant 
level data are used to estimate the wage equations. This finding is fully in line with 
speculations by Robert Z. Lawrence when commenting on the pioneering paper by 
Bernard and Jensen (1995). 
 
Our results imply that – at least for western Germany – some further questions 
related to the issue of exporter wage premia are no longer on the research agenda 
of the microeconometrics of exporting. These include the direction of causality (do 
exports cause higher wages, or vice versa?), the theoretical explanation (why do 
exporting firms pay premia to their workers?), and the policy implications (are jobs 
in exporting firms better jobs that should be protected and subsidized?). Evidently, 
our results have to be replicated with linked employer-employee data sets from 
other countries before they may be taken for granted. Hopefully, our analysis can 
provide a stimulus for those researchers that have access to such data sets to 
invest some time in solving the exporter wage premium puzzle with better data.   12 
Table 1:  Synopsis of studies on exporter wage differentials 
Author(s) 
(year of publication) 
Country 
(period covered) 




(1986 – 1989) 
Sample of 138 export firms 
and 436 non-export firms 
from five industries (food, 
wine, wood products, 
chemicals, basic metal) 
Median value of average annual wage  The null hypothesis of equal means for wage levels among export 
and non- export firms (for small and large firms separately) is 
rejected at the 1 per cent level of significance. Workers of export 
firms have consistently higher wages than those from non-export 
firms in all industries. (Note that a wages than those from non-
export firms in all industries. (Note that a firm was considered an 
exporter if at least 30 per cent of its production was destined for 
foreign markets; non-exporters sell only on the domestic market. 




(1981 – 1991) 
5,956 to 6,909 
manufacturing plants 
(unbalanced panel) 
Average annual wages for all workers, blue 
collar workers, white collar workers, 
technicians, and managers 
Average annual wages are much higher in exporting plants than 
in non-exporting plants by all five measures of wages in all plants 
and in plants from three different size classes (less than 30, 30 to 
100, more than 100 workers). Exporter wage premia are 
statistically significant for all wage measures after controlling for 
plant size, industry, region, year, export/sales ratio, and capital 
per worker. Fixed effects regressions including the exports/sales 
ratio, plant size, capital per worker, and year estimate exporter 
wage premia between 1.5 percent (for white collar workers) and 




(1994 – 1999) 
2,335 observations on 
manufacturing firms 
(unbalanced panel) with 
420 firms in 1994 and 303 
firms in 1999. 
Average labor costs  Average labor costs for exporters equal about four times (1994) 
and three times (1999) the average labor costs for non-exporters. 
Bernard and Wagner 
(1997) 
Germany 
[Federal State of 
Lower Saxony] 
(1978 – 1992) 
4,263 manufacturing 
plants in 1978;  
4,270 manufacturing 
plants in 1992 
Average annual wage;  
average annual production wage;  
average annual non-production wage 
Average annual wage, production wage and non-production wage 
is higher in all plants and in plants with less than 250 employees 
in 1978 and 1992, but not for plants with more than 250 or more 
than 500 employees. Wage differences are much more 
pronounced for white-collar workers. Exporter wage premia are in 
part statistically significant after controlling for plant size, capital 
per worker, production hours per worker, a multi-plant dummy, 
and industry: the average wage premium in exporting plants is 2.6 
percent, while blue-collar workers receive no premium and white-
collar workers are paid 3.3 percent more. Results including export 
intensity are similar. In a fixed effects specification both the 
premia for average wages and for white-collar wages remain 
significant.   13 
Arnold and Hussinger 
(2004) 
Germany 
(1992 – 2000) 
Unbalanced panel of 2,149 
observations on the firm 
level taken from the 
Mannheim Innovation 
Panel covering the 
manufacturing sector 
Wage per employee (exact definition not 
given) 
The wage per employee for the 1,260 exporters is 24.7 percent 
higher than the wage paid by the 889 non-exporters. Note that 
firms are considered to be exporters only if they sell at least five 




(1990 – 1998) 
ca. 69,000 to 97,000 
manufacturing plants 
(unbalanced panel) 
Average wage;  
average production worker wage;  
average non-production worker  wage 
Average wages are higher in exporting plants than in non-
exporting plants by all three measures of wages in 1990, 1994 
and 1998. Exporter  wage premia are statistically significant and 
high controlling for industry, region and plant size (in 1998, 12.5 
percent, 10.5 percent, and 12.0 percent for the three different 




(1986 – 1990) 
2,370 manufacturing 
plants (balanced panel) 
Average annual wage and benefits;  
average annual production wage;  
average annual non-production wage; 
average hourly production wage;  
average hourly non-production wage; 
average annual benefits 
Exporting plants pay higher average amounts than non-exporting 
plants for all measures of wages and benefits in 1986 and 1992. 
Exporter premia are statistically significant after controlling for 
capital per worker, hours per worker, size of plant, foreign 
ownership, white collar/total employment, industry, state and 
year. In a fixed-effects model only the premia for benefits per 
employee is statistically significant. However, the number of 
plants changing from non-exporter to exporter or vice versa is 
rather small so the results from the fixed effects model rely on a 




(1986 – 1990) 
2,353 manufacturing 
plants 
Average white-collar wages;  
average blue-collar wages;  
average earnings including non-wage 
benefits and social security contributions but 
excluding profit sharing;  
average earnings including everything 
Average wages are much higher in exporting plants than in non-
exporting plants by all four measures of wages. Exporter wage 
premia are statistically significant and high controlling for industry 
and state; and controlling for size of firm, capital-labor ratio, white-
collar worker share in total employment, foreign equity 
participation dummy, imported machinery share, royalty payment 
share, total factor productivity growth, tariff rates on outputs and 
inputs, and license requirements on outputs and inputs. Exporter 
wage premia are statistically significant and high (between 7 and 




(1984 – 2001) 
(1993 – 2001) 
3,003 manufacturing 
plants for 1993 – 2001 in a 
balanced panel;  
3,605 manufacturing 
plants for 1993 – 2001 in 
an unbalanced panel;  
706 plants for 1984 – 2001 
in a balanced panel 
 
Average white-collar hourly wage;  
average blue-collar hourly wage;  
ratio of white-collar / blue-collar wage 
Average white-collar and blue-collar wages, and ratio of white-
collar to blue- collar wage higher for exporters than for non-
exporters in 1993, 1997, and 2001 (balanced panel 1993 - 2001); 





(1990 – 1999) 
10,145 observations on 
1,403 manufacturing 
plants (unbalanced panel) 
Average wage per hour  Average wages are higher in exporting firms than in non-
exporting firms for all firms, small firms, and large firms in 1990 
and 1999; note that differences are small in large firms (0.3 Euro 
and 0.5 Euro, respectively). Exporter wage premium is statistically 
significant and positive (6 percent) controlling for firm size, 
industry, year, foreign ownership, and firm age. 
Hansson and Lundin 
(2003) 
Sweden 
(1990 – 1999) 
3,275 manufacturing firms 
(between 1,565 and 1,820 
each year) in an 
unbalanced panel. 
Average annual labor costs (including social 
security) per employee;  
average earning per employee;  
average earnings of skilled employees; 
average earnings of less-skilled employees 
Average wages are significantly higher for all four wage measures 
in exporting firms than in non-exporting firms in 1990; in 1999, 
this holds only for skilled employees (while exporting firms had on 
average lower labor costs per employee). Using pooled data for 
1990 to 1999 (15, 262 or 15,413 observations) exporter wage 
premia are computed controlling for export share, firm size, 
capital intensity, industry and year dummies; results are positive 
and statistically significant for average labor costs (wage 
premium: 1 percent), average earnings per employee (1.5 
percent), and average earnings of skilled workers (7 percent), but 
not for average earnings of less- skilled workers. 




80,584 firms in ten 
manufacturing industries 
from the 1986 census 
Average annual wage of non-production 
labor and of production labor 
For all ten industries exporters pay higher wages than non-
exporters to both their non-production and production labor. The 
average cross-industry export wage premium (after controlling for 
firm size, foreign capital, firm age, multiplant status, and 
technology investment) is almost 30 percent for non-production 
workers and 14 percent for production workers. 
Liu, Tsou and Hammitt 
(1999) 
Taiwan 
(1989 – 1993) 
875 plants from electronics 
industry (balanced panel) 
Information on exports 
only available for 1990 and 
1992 
Average annual wage  Average annual wage is much higher in exporting plants than in 
non- exporting plants in 1992. Exporter  wage premium is 
statistically significant and positive (15.5 percent) in a random 
effects regression controlling for capital intensity, ratio of 
subcontracting revenues to total sales, and ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total sales. 
Tsou, Liu and Hammitt 
(2002) 
Taiwan 
(1986 – 1996) 
Plant level data from the 
electrical machinery and 
electronics industry; 5,923 
plants in 1986, 8,346 
plants 
Average annual wage  Average annual wages were significantly higher for exporters 
than for non-exporters; the differentials were 23.8 percent in 1991 
and 18.6 percent in 1996.   15 
 
Bernard and Jensen 
(1995) 
U.S. 
(1976 – 1987) 
193,463 manufacturing 
plants (1987 Census of 
Manufactures) ca. 400,000 
manufacturing plants 
(pooled data for 1976 – 
1987) 
Average annual wage per worker;  
average annual wage per production worker; 
average annual wage per non-production 
worker; average annual benefits per worker 
All average wages and benefits are higher in exporting plants 
than in non- exporting plants of all size classes, and with less 
than 250 employees or with 250 and more employees in 1987. 
Exporter wage premia are statistically significant for all categories 
of wages and benefits after controlling for capital per worker, 
hours per worker, size of plant, multi-plant dummy, industry, year, 
plant age, and region, amounting to 4.4 percent for wage per 
worker and 7.6 percent for benefits. Coefficients of exporter 
status dummies are statistically significant in fixed effects 
regressions controlling for capital per worker, hours per worker, 
size of plant, and year. 
Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) 
U.S. 
(1984 – 1992) 
56,257 manufacturing 
plants in 1984;  
199,258 manufacturing 
plants in 1987;  
224,009 manufacturing 
plants in 1992 
Annual average wage;  
annual average production wage;  
annual average non-production wage 
Exporter wage premia are statistically significant after controlling 
for industry, state, and plant size. Estimates for 1992 are 9.3 
percent for average wage, 6.6 percent for production wage, and 
4.6 for non-production wage. 
Bernard and Jensen 
(2001) 
U.S. 
(1984 – 1992) 
13,550 manufacturing 
plants (balanced panel) 
Average annual wage;  
annual blue-collar wage;  
annual white-collar wage 
Exporter wage premia are statistically significant after controlling 
for industry and state in 1984 and 1992; estimates for 1992 are 
6.9 percent for average wage and blue-collar wage, and 3.7 










(1992 / 1996) 
approx. 200 firms and 
three consecutive years in 
each country except Cote 
d’Ivoir (two years) and 
Burundi and Ethiopia (one 
year); unbalanced panels. 
Average wage;  
production wage;  
non-production wage 
Exporter wage premia is statistically significant and high (about 
40 percent) for average wage after controlling for country, year, 
industry, location, and plant size. The premia is statistically 
significant and high (about 33 percent) for non-production wage in 
a sub-sample with information on it, but not statistically significant 
for production wage. 
Note:  The studies are listed in alphabetical order of the country considered; studies covering up to three countries are listed separately for each country, other 
multi-country studies are listed at the bottom of the table. 
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Table 3a:  Wage Regressions, Manufacturing, Western Germany 
      (Endogenous Variable: Log. Wage) 
 
    Model    
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 




















Age of employee squared 









Gender (1 = female) 
      
-0.189 
[43.30]** 
Professional status: (reference: 
unskilled blue collar worker)           




















    White collar worker 









Part-time employee (1 = yes) 
    
-0.318 
[28.91]** 










Foreign employee (1 = yes) 
    
-0.020 
[5.76]** 










Logarithm of establishment size 











Proportions within total workforce 
of plant:       




















     Workers with graduate  






















[2.59]**  17 
Economic performance of 
establishment (reference: 
average  performance)       






















Paid overtime work in 











Shift work in establishment  











Collective agreement (reference: 
no collective agreement)       






















Use of technology (index, 1= 











Establishment formation in the 











Year Dummies (reference: year 
=  1995)       




















98 dummies for individual 
profession      
yes** 
9 federal state dummies  yes**  yes*  yes  yes**  yes** 











       
Number of observations: total 
(censored) 
2697 2697 2697 2948 1,860,710 
(224,853) 
Estimation  Method  OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit 
R
2  0.492 0.535 0.532 0.781  
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. **/ * denote   
significance at the 1%/5% level, respectively.  18 
Table 3b:  Wage Regressions, Manufacturing, Western Germany 
      (Endogenous Variable: Log. Wage) 
 
    Model    
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 




















Age of employee squared 









Gender (1 = female) 
      
-0.189 
[43.47]** 
Professional status: (reference: 
unskilled blue collar worker)           




















    White collar worker 









Part-time employee (1 = yes) 
    
-0.318 
[28.93]** 










Foreign employee (1 = yes) 
    
-0.020 
[5.75]** 










Logarithm of establishment size 











Proportions within total workforce 
of plant:       




















     Workers with graduate  






















[2.61]**  19 
Economic performance of 
establishment (reference: 
average  performance)       






















Paid overtime work in 











Shift work in establishment  











Collective agreement (reference: 
no collective agreement)       






















Use of technology (index,  











Establishment formation in  











Year Dummies (reference: year = 
1995)       




















98 dummies for individual 
profession      
yes** 
9 federal state dummies  yes**  yes*  yes  yes**  yes** 











       
Number of observations: total 
(censored) 
2697 2697 2697 2948 1,860,710 
(224,853) 
Estimation  Method  OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit 
R
2  0.493 0.536 0.532 0.781  
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. **/ * denote   
    significance at the 1%/ 5% level, respectively.   20 
Table 4a:  Wage Regressions; Separately for Blue-collar Workers (BC) and 
White-Collar Workers (WC), Manufacturing, Western Germany 
      (Endogenous Variable: Log. Wage) 
  Model 4  Model 5 
Variables BC  WC  BC  WC 


























Gender (1 = female) 





Professional status: (reference: 
unskilled blue collar worker)        
    Skilled blue collar worker  0.083 
[3.28]**   
0.066 
[10.79]**   


























Logarithm of establishment size 









Proportions within total workforce of 
plant:        
















     Workers with graduate  









Economic performance of 
establishment (reference: average 
performance)        

















[0.41]  21 
Paid overtime work in establishment 









Shift work in establishment  









Collective agreement (reference: no 
collective agreement)         




























Establishment formation in the last 5 









Year Dummies (reference: year = 
1995)        
















98 dummies for individual profession      yes**  yes** 
9 federal state dummies  yes**  yes**  yes**  yes** 









        
Number of observations: total 





Estimation method  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit 
R
2 0.614  0.646     
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. **/ * denote   
    significance at the 1%/5% level, respectively.  22 
Table 4b:  Wage Regressions; Separately for Blue-Collar Workers (BC) and 
White-Collar Workers (WC), Manufacturing, Western Germany 
      (Endogenous Variable: Log. Wage) 
  Model 4  Model 5 
Variables  BC WC  BC WC 


























Gender (1 = female) 





Professional status: (reference: 
unskilled blue collar worker)      
    Skilled blue collar worker  0.088 
[3.47]**   
0.065 
[10.66]**   


























Logarithm of establishment size 









Proportions within total workforce 
of plant:      
















     Workers with graduate  









Economic performance of 
establishment (reference: average 
performance)      















[0.42]  23 
Paid overtime work in 









Shift work in establishment  









Collective agreement (reference: 
no collective agreement)         


















Use of technology (index, 1= new, 









Establishment formation in the last 









Year Dummies (reference: year = 
1995)      
















98 dummies for individual 
profession    
yes** yes** 
9 federal state dummies  yes**  yes**  yes**  yes** 









      
Number of observations: total 





Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit 
R
2 0.610  0.644     
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. **/ * denote   
    significance at the 1%/5% level, respectively.  24 
Appendix 1:  Descriptive Statistics; Regression Sample (Individual Level),  
    Manufacturing,  Western  Germany 




Variables  mean  s.d. mean  s.d. mean  s.d. 
Logarithm of daily wage 
(in Pfennigen) 
9.775 0.293 9.694 0.223 9.995 0.235 
Exports (proportion of total 
sales) 
0.396 0.238 0.392 0.232 0.407 0.251 
Exporting plant (1 = yes)  0.921  0.270  0.926  0.261  0.910  0.286 
Age of employee (years)  40.160  10.296  39.345  10.351  41.621  10.102 
Age of employee squared 
(divided by 100) 
17.188  8.486 16.551  8.406 18.343  8.565 
Gender (1 = female)  0.197  0.397  0.139  0.346  0.238  0.426 
Professional status: 
(reference: unskilled blue 
collar worker) 
      
    Skilled blue collar worker  0.281  0.449  0.436  0.496  0.000  0.000 
    Master craftsmen, 
foremen 
0.023 0.150 0.036 0.186 0.000 0.000 
    White collar worker  0.322  0.467  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000 
Part-time employee  
(1 = yes) 
0.034 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Married employee (1 = yes)  0.646  0.478  0.640  0.480  0.646  0.478 
Foreign employee (1 = yes)  0.131  0.337  0.183  0.387  0.033  0.178 
Logarithm of establishment 
size 
7.509 1.297 7.517 1.308 7.513 1.269 
Logarithm of establishment 
size squared (divided by 
100) 
0.581 0.194 0.582 0.195 0.581 0.190 
Proportions within total 
workforce of plant: 
       
     Female workers  0.131  0.097  0.184  0.152  0.209  0.134 
     Foreign workers  0.100  0.088  0.140  0.101  0.114  0.089 
     Workers with graduate  
     degree 
0.034 0.043 0.079 0.068 0.140 0.108 
     Part-time employees  0.197  0.150  0.030  0.039  0.037  0.038 
Economic performance of 
establishment (reference: 
average performance) 
      
     Good   0.234  0.423  0.227  0.419  0.245  0.430 
     Bad   0.391  0.488  0.394  0.489  0.389  0.487  25 
Paid overtime work in 
establishment (1 = yes) 
0.899 0.301 0.898 0.303 0.906 0.292 
Shift work in establishment 
(1 = yes) 
0.944 0.223 0.959 0.194 0.917 0.265 
Collective agreement 
(reference: no collective 
agreement) 
      
     at sectoral level  0.929  0.257  0.925  0.263  0.936  0.245 
     at firm level  0.051  0.220  0.056  0.229  0.043  0.202 
Use of technology (index, 
1= new, 5 = old) 
1.986 0.653 1.990 0.661 1.979 0.635 
Establishment formation in 
the last 5 years (1 = yes) 
0.059 0.235 0.058 0.234 0.062 0.240 
Year Dummies (reference: 
year = 1995) 
       
     1996  0.336  0.472  0.331  0.471  0.344  0.475 
     1997  0.354  0.478  0.354  0.478  0.353  0.478 








        
Source: LIAB 1995-1997.  26 
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